讲座题目：The Economics of Analyst-Auditor Connections
讲座地点：宁远 429 报告内容：We examine the effects of school ties between analysts and the signatory auditors of companies they cover. We perform our analysis on a sample of listed companies in China, where time-series information on school ties are available for analysts and auditors. We term analysts and auditors who attended the same university as “connected” when the analyst covers a company for which the auditor signs the audit opinion. We find that connected analysts issue earnings forecasts that are more accurate and less optimistically biased than those issued by other analysts following the same companies. This is consistent with auditors providing connected analysts with non-public information that improves analysts’ forecast performance. We also find that connected auditors are less likely to lose their existing clients, and more likely to attract new clients that are covered by a connected analyst. This is consistent with connected analysts reciprocating for the private information they receive （or anticipate receiving） from connected auditors. Finally, we also find evidence that the information sharing between connected auditors and analysts improves client companies’ information environment. We contribute to the literature by finding evidence of a novel new channel through which analysts obtain information that improves their forecasting performance and through which auditors inform capital markets.
报告人简介：罗淑清，香港大学会计学副教授，在The Accounting Review, Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 以及Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory等国际顶级期刊有多篇高水平发表。